



2026:AHC-LKO:19677

**HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW**

APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 122 of 2021

Indra Pal Singh And Another

.....Applicant(s)

Versus

State of U.P. and Another

.....Opposite Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)	:	Prashant Singh Atal, Dr. Pooja Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)	:	G.A., Anshuman Singh, Dhananjay Kumar Maurya

Court No. - 16

HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

1. List revised. Case called out. No one appeared on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 to oppose the present application despite names of Shri Anshuman Singh and Shri Dhananjay Kumar Maurya, Advocates have been printed as counsel for the opposite party no. 2. However, Dr. Pooja Singh, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned AGA-I for the State are present.

2. In view of the aforesaid, this Court proceeded hear the instant application.

3. By means of this application under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short "CrPC"), the applicants have sought quashing of Complaint Case No. 210 of 2018, under Sections 452, 323, 504, 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short "IPC") and 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short Act, 1989), Police Station - Kotwali, District - Sitapur pending in the Court of Special Judge, (SC/ST Act), Sitapur (in short "trial Court"). The impugned Summoning order dated 12.02.2020 passed in the Complaint Case No. 210 of 2018 is also under challenge whereby the trial Court summoned the applicants to face trial for offense under Sections 452, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of Act, 1989.

4. Brief facts of the case, as stated by learned counsel for the applicants, are that the applicants have been made accused in Complaint Case No. 210 of 2018 (Supra) which is pending before the trial Court. The allegations are to the effect that the applicants namely Indrapal Singh and Smt. Mubeen Fatima along with others reached the house of the opposite party no.02 on 23.03.2018 and used abusive language indicating the caste

of opposite party No.2 and threatened to murder her and were compelling the opposite party no.2 to admit that she was second wife of Head Munshi Uday Shankar Mishra. It has been further alleged that she was slapped and pulled by her hairs regarding which she filed the complaint dated 21.12.2018 i.e. after an unexplained delay of nine months), under Section 200 CrPC supported with an affidavit.

5. Dr. Pooja Singh, learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the applicants had gone for inquiry to the house of the opposite party no.2 on 23.03.2018 in their official capacity as Deputy Superintendent of Police and Inspector of Police, respectively, and they were obstructed in every manner possible by the opposite party no.2 during the discharge of their official duty. It is pertinent to mention that no medical report has been made available by the opposite party no.2 along with her application under Section 200 CrPC.

6. She has further submitted that the statement of opposite party no.2 was recorded under Section 200 CrPC on 16.01.2019 and the statement of Chhottani and Deepak were also recorded under Section 202 CrPC on 07.03.2019 and 18.07.2019, respectively, in the complaint aforesaid.

7. She has further submitted that the trial Court, without application of mind and without considering the material available on the record, passed the impugned summoning order dated 12.02.2020 by which the applicants have been summoned to face trial for offense under Section 452, 423, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of Act, 1989.

8. She has further submitted that the opposite party no.2 has already filed a complaint bearing Complaint No. 1626 of 2018 (now complaint case 484 of 2018), under Sections 323, 392, 504 506 IPC, Police Station – Kotwali, District - Sitapur regarding the same incident on 09.04.2018 which is still pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Sitapur (in short “Magistrate”).

9. She has further submitted that the opposite party no.2 deliberately concealed the fact of having filed one complaint before the Magistrate on 09.04.2018 on the same set of facts. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the opposite party no.2 has not come with clean hands to file the complaint dated 21.12.2018 before the trial Court. Opposite party no.2 has already recorded her statement dated 09.04.2018 under Section 200 CrPC before the Magistrate wherein she stated that on 23.03.2018 one unknown woman along with 10 police personnel and 4 persons with civvies entered into her house at about 01.30 PM and at that time her brother Deepak and

son were present there. She further stated that she had one son aged about 10 years. It is also to be noted that the opposite party no.2 was not able to disclose any name. Bare perusal of the letter dated 27.03.2018 of the opposite party no.2 written to the District Magistrate, Sitapur, annexed with the complaint, shows that she admitted to have only one son. She changed her statement given on oath before the trial Court on 16.01.2019 wherein she further stated that she had two sons aged about 10 years and 3 years. It is also to be mentioned that under no circumstances there would be any possibility to have another son of 3 years within a period of 9 months. From bare perusal of both the sworn statements, manifests that this would amount to false testimony. It shows that the opposite party no.2 doesn't have slightest fear of giving false testimony on oath before various forums.

10. She has further submitted that even after filing the complaint before the Magistrate, the opposite party No.2 filed the writ petition bearing **Misc. Bench No. 20618 of 2018 (Smt. Sangeeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. and Others)** which was dismissed vide order dated 24.07.2018 with the observation that the petition was frivolous and had been filed without disclosing the necessary facts. This fact was also deliberately concealed to the trial Court by the opposite party no.2. In paragraph no.5 of the aforesaid Writ Petition also, opposite party no.2 admitted to have one son.

11. She has further submitted that the opposite party no.2 moved the complaint before Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Caste Commission (in short "Commission") in which inquiry was conducted and the allegations were found false in which the categorical finding has been recorded that the applicants visited the opposite party no.2 only with a purpose of inquiry which was pending against Shri Uday Shankar Mishra in which the allegation was that the opposite party No.2 was the second wife of the Uday Shankar Mishra while the first was still alive and was not divorced.

12. She has further submitted that Inquiry Report of Circle Officer (City) Sitapur dated 18.10.2018 was submitted to the Commission which was considered by the Commission on 06.02.2018 and opposite party no.2 was also present before the Commission on that day, and the Commission was pleased to accept the report of the Inquiry Officer and disposed of the matter. After having failed to falsely implicate the applicants through the Commission, opposite party no.2 had filed the complaint dated 21.12.2018 before the trial Court suppressing the fact that in her false complaint before the Commission nothing adverse was found against the applicants. On the contrary it was recorded that the complainant was not

cooperating with the investigation and was making false allegations against the applicants.

13. he has further submitted that Uday Shankar Mishra, Head Constable, was dismissed from service vide order dated 14.5.2019 passed by Additional Director General of Police, Police Training College, Moradabad in which the main allegation was that the opposite party No.2 is the second wife of Shri Uday Shankar Mishra. In the inquiry against Uday Shankar Mishra, the applicant no.2/Smt. Mubeen Fatima was a witness and applicant no.1 had conducted the preliminary inquiry due to which the complaint has been filed with mala fide intention and ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance and to blackmail the petitioners. The complainant/opposite party no.2 filed photostat copies of many papers including the aforesaid final order dated 14.05.2019. It is pertinent to mention that the final order dated 14.05.2019 consists of 28 pages. But, opposite party no.2 deliberately, with a view to play fraud on the court, has filed page nos. 1, 3, 5, 6 and 28 only. The trial Court has not applied his judicial mind on this document. The trial Court was liable to direct the opposite party no.2 to produce the entire document for inquiry since the Court can summon any document at the stage of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC as per power conferred by Section 91 CrPC.. Due to non-application of judicial mind on this document, he has not summoned the entire document. Bare perusal of the entire document, on its own, would negate all the allegations of the complaint. In order to conceal total facts to the knowledge of the trial Court, opposite party no.2 filed only certain pages to suit her interest and falsely strengthen her case. The opposite party no.2 has been living with Uday Shankar Mishra in Sitapur which came to light through an enquiry. In the departmental inquiry, it was found that the opposite party No.2 is the second wife of Uday Shankar Mishra and it was also found that a child was born from the wedlock of Uday Shankar Mishra and the opposite party No.2 and in the birth certificate name of Uday Shankar Mishra has been shown as father of the child whose mother is the opposite party No.2.

14. She has further submitted that the the trial Court has given a finding that on the basis of available evidence in the file, it becomes clear that Head Constable Uday Shankar Mishra was found guilty of contracting second marriage with the complainant/opposite party no.2 and as a result of which he has been dismissed from service. The trial Court further confirms that the dismissal order was produced by the complainant/opposite party no.2 before the Court. However, as described in previous paragraphs entire dismissal order was not produced by the

complainant; only selective portions of dismissal order was produced with a view to conceal material facts from the knowledge of the learned court. Thus, the trial Court came to know the background of the complaint case.

Dr. Pooja Singh, learned counsel for the applicants has taken specific ground that the opposite party no.2 had moved an application for permission to prosecute the applicants, as per provisions of Section 197 CrPC but no sanction has been granted till date. The same statement of fact has been made in paragraph 22 of the application. She has also pointed out that reply of the said paragraph 22 has been made by the State in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit and there is no specific denial of the averment that there was any such sanction granted by the State Government.

15. Learned counsel for the applicants has further submitted that the complained lodged by the opposite party no.2 is totally based on mala fide intention for the reason that the applicants had conducted an inquiry and they found that she was the second wife of Uday Shankar Mishra and she was annoyed for the aforesaid reason that is why she instituted the criminal proceeding against the applicants. The proof of inquiry done by the applicants are mentioned in the dismissal order of the husband of the opposite party no.2 dated 14.05.2019.

16. Learned counsel for the applicants has further submitted that the opposite party no.2 had also filed the complaint before the Magistrate for the same set of facts, which was pending but she suppressed this fact and filed the present complaint with slight changes in the statement under Section 200 CrPC, in which the applicants have been summoned to face the trial for offense under Section 452, 423, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of Act, 1989.

17. Dr. Pooja Singh, learned counsel has submitted that the applicants have discharged their duties as inquiry officers, there is no illegality committed by them by submitting the report against the opposite party no.2.

18. She has placed reliance on paragraphs 21 to 23 of the judgment passed in the case of **Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another, reported in [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1602.**

"21. For ease of reference, Section 197 of the CrPC is extracted as under:

"197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.

(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction-

(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State of the State Government :[Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted.] [Added by Act 43 of 1991, Section 2 (w.e.f. 2-5-1991).]

22. As already noted, the object and purpose of the said provision is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section 197 of the CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognizance of such offences which are mentioned in the said provision except with the previous sanction of the appropriate government when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant. There is no doubt that in the instant case the appellant herein was a public servant but the question is, whether, while discharging her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which did not require the first respondent herein to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the appellant herein. In this regard, the salient words which are relevant under sub-section (1) of Section 197 are "is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction". Therefore, for the purpose of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is that the public servant is accused of any offence which had been committed by him in "discharge of his official duty". The said expression would clearly indicate that Section 197 of the CrPC would not apply to a case if a public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors or not connected to the discharge of his or her official duty. However, there are a line of judgments which have considered this expression in two different ways which we shall now advert to.

23. Learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the appellant have submitted the following judgments which indicate that Section 197(1) would apply prior to the initiation of a criminal proceeding under Section 197 of the CrPC. On the basis of the said judgments they have contended that it is during the discharge of her official duty that the demolition had taken place in the instant case and therefore, the necessity of an order of sanction being passed by the Government was a sine qua non prior to initiation of the criminal proceeding. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant herein could be adverted to at this stage.

a) In *D.T. Virupakshappa v. C. Subhash*, (2015) 12 SCC 231 ("*D.T. Virupakshappa*"), the appellant therein was accused in a private complaint

before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, on which the learned Magistrate took cognizance, registered Criminal Case No. 74 of 2009 and issued summons to the appellant therein. The offences alleged were under Sections 323, 324, 326, 341, 120, 114, 506 read with Section 149 of the IPC. The appellant therein moved the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC which was declined by the impugned order therein. The main contention of the appellant therein was that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the alleged offences and issued process to the appellant without sanction from the State Government under Section 197 of CrPC, and on that sole ground, the High Court should have quashed the proceedings. It was alleged that the appellant therein exceeded in exercising his power during investigation of a criminal case and assaulted the respondent therein in order to extract some information with regard to the death of a person, and in that connection, the respondent therein was detained in the police station for some time. Therefore, the allegation of the appellant therein had an essential connection with the discharge of the official duty and therefore, the previous sanction was necessary. The issue of "police excess" during investigation and requirement of sanction for prosecution in that regard, was also a subject-matter in *State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew*, (2004) 8 SCC 40 ("*Ganesh Chandra Jew*") which was relied upon. There was also reliance on *Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand*, (2012) 12 SCC 72 ("*Om Prakash*"). The Court held that the ratio of the aforesaid two judgments squarely apply to the case of the appellant therein and having regard to the factual matrix of that case, it was observed that the offensive conduct was reasonably connected with the performance of the official duty of the appellant therein. Therefore, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the case without the previous sanction of the State Government and the High Court had missed this crucial point in the impugned order. This Court observed that in case such sanction is obtained and the same is produced before the learned Magistrate, the matter could be proceeded further before the learned Magistrate in accordance with law.

b) In *Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar*, (2000) 8 SCC 500 ("*Abdul Wahab Ansari*"), the facts were that the son of the deceased, who was respondent No. 2 therein, had filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging commission of offences by the appellant therein under Sections 302, 307, 380, 427, 504, 147, 148 and 149 of the IPC as well as Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC would have no application to the facts of the case. Further, there was sufficient evidence available to establish a *prima facie* case and therefore had directed issuance of non-bailable warrants against the appellant therein and other accused persons. The appellant therein moved the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC praying, *inter alia*, that no cognizance could be taken without a sanction of the appropriate Government, as required under Section 197 of the CrPC as the appellant was discharging his official duty pursuant to an order of the competent authority. The High Court opined that all the questions could be raised at the time of framing of charge and disposed the application filed by the appellant therein. Before this Court, two questions were raised and it was observed that previous sanction of the competent authority being a precondition for the Court taking cognizance of the offences if the offences alleged had been committed by the accused was in discharge of his official duty, the question touched upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the

matter of taking cognizance and therefore, there was no requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till the charges were framed. Placing reliance on certain decisions of this Court, it was observed in this case that the appellant therein had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to be present with police force and remove the encroachment in question and in the course of discharge of his duty to control the mob, he had directed for opening of fire, which was in exercise of the power conferred upon him and the duty imposed upon him under the orders of the Magistrate. Hence, Section 197(1) of the CrPC applied to the facts of the case. Since no sanction had been taken, the cognizance by the Magistrate was bad in law and therefore, the same was quashed qua the appellant therein and the appeal was allowed.

c) In D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 ("D. Devaraja"), the facts were that the High Court had disposed of the application under Section 482 of the CrPC which was filed for quashing the order passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate III, Bengaluru City in taking cognizance of a private complaint, inter alia, against the appellant-accused therein, for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 220, 323, 330, 348 and 506-B read with Section 34 of the IPC. The High Court did not quash the impugned order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated 27.12.2006, but remitted the complaint back to the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate instead, with, inter alia, liberty to the appellant-accused therein to apply for discharge. The question considered by this Court was whether the learned Magistrate could, at all, have taken cognizance against the appellant therein, in the private complaint, in the absence of a sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, as amended by the Karnataka Police (Amendment) Act, 2013, and if not, whether the High Court should have quashed the impugned order of the Magistrate concerned, instead of remitting the complaint to the Magistrate concerned and requiring the appellant-accused therein to appear before him and file an application for discharge. Referring to several judgments of this Court, Indira Banerjee, J. speaking for the Bench observed in paragraph 66 to paragraph 71 as under:

"66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from facing harassing, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the Government, to prosecute would give an upright police officer the confidence to discharge his official duties efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by initiation of criminal action, from which he would be protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. At the same time, if the policeman has committed a wrong, which constitutes a criminal offence and renders him liable for prosecution, he can be prosecuted with sanction from the appropriate Government.

67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with

Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly not require sanction. To cite an example, a policeman assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic violence would certainly not be entitled to protection. However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal the act may be.

68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the protection of the government sanction for initiation of criminal action against him.

69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in discharge of official duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done in discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority.

70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman or any other public servant unconnected with the official duty there can be no question of sanction. However, if the act alleged against a policeman is reasonably connected with discharge of his official duty, it does not matter if the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers and/or acted beyond the four corners of law.

71. If the act alleged in a complaint purported to be filed against the policeman is reasonably connected to discharge of some official duty, cognizance thereof cannot be taken unless requisite sanction of the appropriate Government is obtained under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act."

It was concluded that the High Court had erred in law refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to set aside the impugned order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint, after having held that it was a recognized principle of law that sanction was a legal requirement which empowers the court to take cognizance. This Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order under appeal and

the complaint was quashed for want of sanction.

d) In Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy, Criminal Appeal No. 1359 of 2017 disposed of by three-Judge Bench of this Court on 20.04.2023 of which one of us (Nagarathna, J.) was a member, it was observed that the question of cognizance being taken in the absence of sanction and thereby Section 197 of the CrPC being flouted is not to be conflated and thereby confused with the question as to whether an offence has been committed. The salutary purpose behind Section 197 of the CrPC is protection being accorded to public servants. In paragraphs 28, 29 and 31, it was observed as under:

"(28) The State functions through its officers. Functions of the State may be sovereign or not sovereign. But each of the functions performed by every public servant is intended to achieve public good. It may come with discretion. The exercise of the power cannot be divorced from the context in which and the time at which the power is exercised or if it is a case of an omission, when the omission takes place.

(29) The most important question which must be posed and answered by the Court when dealing with the argument that sanction is not forthcoming is whether the officer was acting in the exercise of his official duties. It goes further. Even an officer who acts in the purported exercise of his official power is given the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. This is for good reason that the officer when he exercises the power can go about exercising the same fearlessly no doubt with bona fides as public functionaries can act only bona fide. In fact, the requirement of the action being bona fide is not expressly stated in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., though it is found in many other statutes protecting public servants from action, civil and criminal against them.

x x x x

(31) One ground which has found favour with the High Court against the appellant is that the appellant, according to the High Court, could raise the issue before the Magistrate.

Here we may notice one aspect. When the question arises as to whether an act or omission which constitutes an offence in law has been done in the discharge of official functions by a public servant and the matter is under a mist and it is not clear whether the act is traceable to the discharge of his official functions, the Court may in a given case tarry and allow the proceedings to go on. Materials will be placed before the Court which will make the position clear and a delayed decision on the question may be justified. However, in a case where the act or the omission is indisputably traceable to the discharge of the official duty by the public servant, then for the Court to not accept the objection against cognizance being taken would clearly defeat the salutary purpose which underlies Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It all depends on the facts and therefore, would have to be decided on a case-to-case basis."

It was concluded that learned Magistrate had erred in the facts of the said case in taking cognizance against the appellant therein contrary to the mandate of Section 197 of the CrPC and on that short ground alone, the appeal was allowed and the proceedings

challenged in Section 482 were quashed. However, it was observed that the same would not stand in the way of the competent authority taking a decision in the matter and/or granting sanction for prosecuting the appellant therein in accordance with law."

19. On the other hand, Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned AGA-I for the State, on the basis of counter affidavit, has submitted that there is no illegality in summons issued by the trial Court.

20. Heard Dr. Pooja Singh, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned AGA-I for the State.

21. After going through the record, I find that the statutory requires as envisaged under Section 197 CrPC has not been followed and there is no sanction granted by the State Government because the counter affidavit filed by the State does not indicate that any sanction was granted.

22. The second argument is also sustainable that the complaint has been filed by the opposite party no.2 is based on mala fide intention. It is the case of the applicants that the applicants were inquiry officers and they had conducted the inquiry and found that the opposite party no.2 was the second wife of Uday Shankar Mishra. Since, such inquiry was conducted by the applicants, she was annoyed that is why she filed the complaint. The complaint appears to be mala fide.

23. The other point is also relevant to be noted that she had also filed the complaint case for same set of facts on 09.04.2018 before the Magistrate. During the pendency of the said case, she filed the present complaint making similar allegations with slight changes in the statement under Section 200 CrPC.

24. In view of aforesaid discussion, the application is **allowed**. The impugned Summoning order dated 12.02.2020 passed in the Complaint Case No. 210 of 2018 is hereby set aside and the proceedings of the Complaint Case No.210 of 2018 pending before the trial Court are hereby quashed qua the applicants.

March 18, 2026

Mohit Singh/-